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A BREAKDOWN, APPLICATION, AND EVALUATION OF THE 





This project investigates the current Resiliency Analysis Support Tool (RAST) and its 
usability with Department of Defense (DoD) military and civilian personnel. With the 
unexpected possibilities of natural and man-made disasters worldwide, RAST could 
inform combatant commanders (CCDRs) and component commanders of resources to 
facilitate recovery and provide humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). 
However, due to the lack of knowledge of RAST, the potential benefits of 
implementation of this system remain unnoticed. This project provides an assessment of 
the current RAST system, its ease of understanding with potential users, and an 
application of the system to a particular disaster in the Pacific Command (PACOM) area 
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The United States military is composed of multiple operational missions that are 
met with precision and information-based decisions to ensure mission completeness.  
These missions range from air warfare (AW), maritime interdiction operations (MIO), 
strike warfare (SW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), just to name a few.  One of the 
major missions that has increasing combatant command (COCOM) involvement is the 
ability to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).  HA/DR can 
involve not only multiple branches in the U.S. military but also multiple nations to bring 
relief to countries that have sustained a natural or man-made disaster.  With the 
advancements in modern technology and the U.S. military forces’ focus on relief efforts 
during major disasters, tools that provide assistance and inform military personnel of the 
availability of local resources are a tremendous advantage.  
Having access to these resources helps organizations and agencies conducting 
HA/DR operations reduce human suffering and casualties; with decision support tools, 
both military and civilian leaders can make informed decisions during crisis response and 
better prepare for impending crises.  To better implement an effective response, 
improvement in the logistic provision of supplies and strategic implementation of 
military resources is needed.  Figure 1 depicts the number of natural disasters reported 
from 1975 to 2011.  The increase shown in Figure 1 is not representative of an actual 
increase in natural disasters but of an increase in media reporting and advancements in 
the communication of those disasters.  Figure 1 shows that, because of the large number 
of disasters that occur every year and the unpredictability of those disasters, organizations 
and agencies need to have readily available information about supplies and how best to 
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Figure 1.  Number of Natural Disasters Reported From 1975 to 2011  
(Emergency Events Database [EM-DAT], 2012) 
In the case of the U.S.’s military, it is key for all combatant commanders 
(CCDRs) to have readily available critical HA/DR data that reside in their respective 
geographic domains so that fully informed decisions are made.  Disaster response 
requires real-time access to common community information; this information must be 
readily available for CCDRs to effectively decide how best to allocate U.S. military 
forces and resources.  Advancements in technology have created tools for identifying 
resources available in multiple countries and intuitively displaying and sharing actionable 
HA/DR information for not only U.S. forces and CCDRs, but also neighboring countries 
that wish to assist by providing resources.  
The Resiliency Analysis Support Tool, known as the RAST, is one such 
advancement in technology that can have the potential to help serve as a decision support 
tool for military and civilian personnel to effectively implement and display resources 
readily available by the country in need.  The RAST is a concept design prototype 
developed by Oakridge National Laboratory.  Their design is for a configurable web-
based analytic system that contains a baseline and operational assessment framework for 
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of readily available resources.  Because the RAST is a concept design prototype, all 
references should be about what the RAST “could be.”  However, for purposes of easier 
reading, we have chosen to refer to the RAST in the present tense throughout this report.  
The RAST diagnoses community needs by sector, system, and population functionality 
and serves to link response to recovery.  It is capable of doing this by interfacing with 
civilian, non-governmental organization (NGO), international humanitarian, and other 
military systems, and by filtering and organizing real-time data by temporal and spatial 
characteristics, and by relevance to community sectors.  
The RAST concept provides a visual display of community resources and allows 
a common understanding of complex humanitarian situations and crises to support 
decision-making by military and civilian personnel.  It could also serve as a situational 
awareness tool of available resources and supplies prior to military or civilian forces’ 
arrival.  Military and civilian forces could better understand and assess the needs of the 
people in distress and even prepare by building a safety stock of supplies in strategic 
locations in the event of a disaster.  We analyze the RAST in thorough detail to show its 
capabilities by breaking down its many system components and evaluating its data 
repository and its social and community frameworks.  Figure 2 shows a snapshot of the 
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Figure 2.  Snapshot of the RAST in the Pacific Fleet Area of Responsibility  
(Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian 
Assistance [COE-DMHA], 2011) 
When relevant logistics data specific to a CCDR’s area of responsibility (AOR) is 
available, the adverse impact on human life is reduced tremendously.  When the RAST is 
made available to the CCDRs (or to private-sector organizations), coordination of relief 
efforts and logistics operations can be implemented in a timely manner, providing 
stabilization of the area and relief and lifesaving services to those in need.  This concept 
will help to increase preparedness for military and civilian organizations while serving as 
a communications tool that can be updated with ease.  
B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this research project is to explore the background and application 
of the RAST in supporting military and civilian organizations in HA/DR.  Specific areas 
of analysis include a thorough breakdown of the software and the capabilities and 
benefits it offers organizational leaders so that better informed decisions are made and 
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With the RAST computer software, input of community resource data can be 
collected from any electronic data source or sensor or by a government provision 
requiring this information.  This data input will help feed into a larger network display 
system that will establish a common understanding for action and collaboration.  With the 
knowledge of available resources pre- and post-crisis, organizations (specific to this 
research, CCDRs) will be able to effectively utilize the military resources that are 
available to provide a timely and efficient response.  
The research objective was to acquire available background data on the RAST to 
describe its benefits to civilian and military organizations.  Also, in this report, we 
provide military users with a basic understanding of the system components to include a 
step-by-step framework of the program while running a scenario-based application in the 
Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
We have structured this report into five chapters. In the first chapter, we 
introduced the project.  In the second chapter, we review the literature and analyze the 
past effectiveness of HA/DR in using technology and the current use of technology in the 
preparation and execution of disaster relief in natural and man-made disasters. In the third 
chapter, we show the methodology used for collecting data and analyzing the RAST.  In 
the fourth chapter, we provide information pertaining to increasing awareness of 
disasters, the DoD’s strategy in HA/DR, and the potential “customers” of the RAST.  In 
the fifth chapter, we observe the data collected and analyze the RAST, with emphasis on 
the framework of the software and remarks on the usefulness while running a PACOM-
based disaster relief scenario.  In the sixth chapter, we provide recommendations to better 
improve the RAST as it is continues to be developed. In the seventh chapter, we present 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF 
1. HA/DR Life Cycle 
In their research, Kovacs and Spens (2007) clearly displayed the three phases of 
disaster relief operations in terms of preparation, immediate response, and reconstruction, 
as shown in Figure 3.  Kovacs and Spens (2007) defined the preparation phase as the 
period before a disaster strikes, the immediate response phase as the time period 
immediately after a disaster strikes, and the reconstruction phase as the aftermath of a 
natural disaster.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Phases of Disaster Relief Operations  
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007) 
Apte (2009) took a similar approach in further developing the timeline of the 
humanitarian supply chain.  As depicted in Figure 4, Apte (2009) provided the process 
flow model of humanitarian logistics that is divided into three different stages along the 
timeline: preparedness, response, and recovery.  Preparation in anticipation of a disaster 
involves the prepositioning of assets and the preparation of infrastructure.  Immediately 
after a disaster strikes, a relief response that involves ramp-up and sustainment follows.  
Lastly, the recovery effort is a long-term, ongoing process that includes collecting data 
about lessons learned.  Although disasters are practically impossible to predict, Apte and 
Yoder (2011) explained that an adequate preparation for earthquakes in fault zones, 
volcanic activity in cities near volcanoes, or hurricanes in hurricane-prone regions can be 
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Figure 4.  Time Line of the Humanitarian Supply Chain 
(Apte, 2009) 
2. Challenges in HA/DR 
Lessons learned from previous catastrophes have led to significant observations 
and analyses among humanitarian logisticians (Apte, 2009).  U.S. military lessons 
learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the Haitian earthquake 
revealed that there is a tendency to relearn lessons from the past.  Among the greatest 
lessons learned from past HA/DR operations are challenges in transmitting 
communication, information exchange, and interagency coordination (Koch, 2011).  Lack 
of planning and coordination results in information gaps and the unclear assignment of 
member responsibilities, which, therefore, unfavorably affect the critical support 
provided (Apte & Yoder, 2011).  To mitigate the negative outcomes during future 
HA/DR efforts, it is important for CCDRs to apply what was learned from past HA/DR 
operations and implement improved plans to correct inefficiencies (Koch, 2011).  
In order for commanders to make decisions for resource allocation, effective 
communications and interagency cooperation are vital to the overall success of HA/DR 
operations:  
For example, the military brought communications, logistics and planning 
capabilities that were critical to Katrina relief operations.  Host 
governments are impartment actors as they control assets such as 
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providers are another important set of actors that can either facilitate or 
constrain the operational effectiveness of humanitarian logistics 
operations.  Extra-regional logistics service providers are also important in 
the supply process, e.g., DHL has contributed to the international relief 
efforts to deliver aid supplies to people and communities affected by the 
South Asia earthquake. (Kovacs & Spens, 2007, p. 107) 
Because HA/DR operations require contributions from everyone involved, failure 
to integrate the agencies and understand the interagency process can damage the overall 
effort of an HA/DR operation (Koch, 2011).  Strengthening the transmission of 
communications, information exchange, and interagency coordination can eliminate 
duplicate efforts and improve efficiency and effectiveness (Apte & Yoder, 2011).  Figure 
5 illustrates the connection of different players in the supply network of humanitarian aid 
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007).   
 
 
Figure 5.  Actors in the Supply Network of Humanitarian Aid 
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007) 
3. Humanitarian Logistics 
Although humanitarian logistics did not receive much interest from practitioners 
and logistics academics prior to the Asian tsunamis in 2004, the element of logistics in 
humanitarian aid has always been an important aspect in conducting HA/DR operations 
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007).  Apte and Yoder (2011) compared humanitarian logistics to 
commercial logistics because logistics play a crucial role in nearly all aspects of society.  
Basic elements that are common to both humanitarian logistics and commercial supply 
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time, information systems, customers, and demand (Apte, 2009).  The basic principles of 
managing the flow of goods, information, and finances from final customers are similar 
for both humanitarian logistics and commercial logistics (Kovacs & Spens, 2007).  The 
main difference is that humanitarian logistics tend to demand zero lead-times and 
flexibility when operating in a disaster area (Apte & Yoder, 2011).   
Kovacs and Spens (2007) also noted that the speed of humanitarian aid after a 
disaster depends on the know-how of logisticians to procure, convey, and receive 
supplies at the location of a humanitarian relief effort.  Humanitarian logistics 
encompasses disaster relief as well as continuous support for developing regions and 
characterizes the different operations that arise at different times due to various 
catastrophes.  The characteristics of humanitarian logistics in disaster relief operations 
and business logistics are summarized in Table 1 (Kovacs & Spens, 2007). 
Table 1.   Characteristics of Humanitarian Logistics 




The main aim Alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people 
 
Actor structure Stakeholder focus with no clear links to each other, 
dominance of NGOs and governmental actors 
 
Three-phase setup Preparation, immediate response, reconstruction 
 
Basic features Variability in supplies and suppliers, large-scale 
activities, irregular demand, and unusual constraints 
in large-scale emergencies 
 
Supply chain philosophy Supplies “pushed” to the disaster location in the 
immediate response phase. Pull philosophy applied in 
reconstruction phase 
 
Transportation and infrastructure Infra-structure destabilized and lack of possibilities to assure 
 quality of food and medical supplies 
 
Time effects Time delays may result in loss of lives 
 
Bounded knowledge actions         The nature of most disasters demands an immediate 
response, hence supply chains need to be designed and 
deployed at once even though the knowledge of the 
situation is very limited. 
 
Supplier structure Choice limited, sometimes even unwanted suppliers 
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4. Crisis Prediction Management Software 
Since the end of the Cold War era, military missions involving humanitarian 
assistance have increased, but the response to disasters has been ineffective and 
inefficient.  The inability to estimate structure damage and to plan disaster relief 
resources was evident after Hurricane Andrew struck Miami-Dade County, Florida, in 
August 1992, thus pressing Senator Barbara Mikulski to request a federal-level review 
(Kehlet, n.d.).  As a result, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the 
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in conjunction with the Science 
Application International Corporation (SAIC), have developed the computer system 
known as the Consequences Assessment Tool Set (CATS; Kaul, n.d.). 
The CATS is an analytical software tool that assesses the consequences from 
natural disasters, such as hurricanes and earthquakes, and technological disasters, such as 
industrial accidents, terrorism, and acts of war (Samuels, 2009).  The CATS provides 
damage prediction models as well as casualty and damage assessment tools.  To allow a 
wide range of consequence assessments, the CATS links the damage prediction models 
and databases in a geographic information system (GIS; Swiatek & Kaul, 1999).  The 
conceptual view of the CATS is nicely illustrated in Figure 6 (Kehlet, n.d.).  The CATS 
helps emergency managers to train, exercise, plan, and prepare, and to calculate 
requirements for humanitarian aid (Samuels, 2009).  The CATS system can be used to 
detect the following: 
 roadblock distributions, 
 population and infrastructure at risk, 
 atmospheric plume footprints, 
 locations and resources for disaster recovery, and 
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Figure 6.  The Consequences Assessment Tool Set Concept 
(Kehlet, n.d.) 
To protect against natural and technological hazards, the CATS system takes real-
time data from local meteorological stations and follows the steps listed in the following 
bulleted lists. 
Before disaster strikes, the CATS system 
 crafts simulation scenarios for training and planning, 
 constructs contingency plans with CATS infrastructure and population 
data, and 
 tracks hurricane and flood damage. 
When disaster strikes, the CATS system 
 assesses the affected populace immediately and accurately, 
 assesses the damage from the National Hurricane Center (NHC) reports, 
 reduces response time, and 
 identifies roadblock locations and safe routes. 
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 assesses the facilities, infrastructure, and population at risk and finds 
resources for a continued response; 
 gathers information for reporting, damage assessment, and lessons 
learned; and 
 gains support for remediation and compensation (Stevens, 2011). 
Since its inception, the credibility of the CATS system has been proven by its 
success in the playing field (Swiatek & Kaul, 1999).  The CATS system supports 
emergency managers with an effective, operative resource to quickly respond to natural 
and technological disasters (Kehlet, n.d.).  The CATS system is operational at many 
locations at the federal and state level and within the Department of Defense (DoD), as 
seen in Table 2 (Swiatek & Kaul, 1999).  Table 3 exhibits numerous exercises, military 
operations, and demonstration conferences that employed the CATS system (Swiatek & 
Kaul, 1999). 
Table 2.   Consequences Assessment Tool Set Operational Locations 
(Swiatek & Kaul, 1999) 

























 Corps of Engineers 
 Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
 Directorate of Military Support 
 Forces Command 
 National Ground Intelligence Center 
 U.S. Pacific Command 
 Pacific Disaster Center 
 U.S. Marine Corps(Camp Lejeune) 
 U.S. Southern Command 
 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 State and Local Governments 
 National Guard RAID Teams 
 Alabama Emergency Management Agency (EMA)  
 Colorado EMA  
 Utah CEM 
 New York City EOC  
 Presidential Infrastructure Protection Task Force 
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Table 3.   Consequences Assessment Tool Set Exercises and Operations 
(Swiatek & Kaul, 1999) 
 
Humanitarian Allied Forces 98 (U.S. SOUTHCOM) 
Blue Advance 98 (U.S. SOUTHCOM) 
Joint Battle Center HA/DR (U.S. PACOM) 
Brave Response 98 (U.S. PACOM) 
Interagency Chemical Exercise 98 (NYC) 
Hurricanes Georges/Mitch 
(U.S. SOUTHCOM) 
NATO 50th Anniversary Celebration 
RESPONSE 95, 96, 98 
Atlanta Olympics 
CUSEC Ellipse Charlie G8 Summit 
Ill Wind 
JWID Makani Pahili 
Pacific Horizon (Java) U.S. Marine Corps CBIRF 




B. THE MILITARY IN DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS 
1. Legal Authorization for Military Disaster Relief Operations 
The DoD is a key resource in response to both domestic disasters and 
international disasters.  The authority to utilize DoD assets nationally comes from the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (RSDREA, 2007).  
This act authorizes the president to make available a wide range of federal aid to states 
that are affected by natural or man-made disasters (Elsea & Mason, 2008).  The use of 
military assets for U.S. civil support is referred to as defense support of civil authorities 
(DSCA).  DoD Directive 3025.18 (DoD, 2012a) established policy and assigned 
responsibilities for the DSCA.  The DSCA is initiated by a written request from civil 
authorities, or qualifying entities, or by authorization from the president or Secretary of 
Defense.  All requests are evaluated for their legality, lethality, risk to DoD forces, source 
of funding, effect on the DoD budget, appropriateness, and impact on DoD readiness to 
perform its other primary missions.  However, federal military commanders do have 
immediate response authority if time does not permit and imminent conditions are present 
that do not allow for the normal approval channel to operate.  Upon request for assistance 
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employing their resources to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate property 
damage within the U.S. (DoD, 2012a). 
With disasters occurring internationally, DoD Directive 5100.46 (DoD, 2012b) 
sets policy and responsibilities for foreign disaster relief (FDR) operations.  The directive 
states that the “DOD shall respond to foreign disasters in support of the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) pursuant to Executive Order 12163 and section 
2292(b) of title 22, U.S.C.” (DoD, 2012b, p. 1).  This assistance can be provided only 
when directed by the president; when the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence of the 
Secretary of State, approves; or when there is an emergency situation that requires 
immediate action to save human lives and time does not permit for the formal 
authorization process (DoD, 2012b).  The primary means for the U.S. government to 
provide foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) is not its military forces.  The 
organization, structure, and readiness of the military enable it to respond rapidly and 
effectively when time is of the essence, but U.S. military forces normally supplement the 
activities of government authorities, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).  
The USAID is the principle agency for humanitarian assistance.  The assistance provided 
by the military is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the agencies or 
host nation civil authorities that have the primary responsibility for humanitarian 
assistance and is intended to be limited in scope and duration (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 
2009). 
2. Military Resources and Organization 
In their supplementing or complementing role, military forces provide capabilities 
that include prompt aid to alleviate suffering of disaster victims, preparation and 
transportation of nonlethal excess property to foreign countries, transfer of DoD supplies 
in response to unplanned emergencies, and transportation of humanitarian and relief 
supplies.  U.S. forces are an important resource for these missions because of their 
operational reach that improves initial response and their capabilities in logistics, 
command and control, communications, and mobility.  The types of FHA missions that 
U.S. military forces normally conduct span a wide range of military operations but most 
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include relief missions, dislocated civilian support missions, security missions, technical 
assistance and support functions, and foreign consequence management.  Relief missions 
are normally the responsibility of NGOs and IGOs, but when these organizations are 
overwhelmed or are in a threatening security environment, U.S. military forces may be 
tasked for immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, 
construct sanitation facilities and shelters, and provide food and medical care.  Dislocated 
civilian support missions are also typically conducted by the United Nations (UN), IGOs, 
or NGOs, but may be delegated to military forces; such missions include camp 
organizations, provision of care, and placement.  Security missions include establishing 
and maintaining conditions for the provision of FHA (e.g., seaports, air terminals, roads, 
railways, secure storage areas) and providing protection for relief personnel.  Technical 
assistance and support functions that the military may provide are communications 
restoration, port operations, emergency medical care, relief supply distribution 
management and delivery, search and rescue, base operating support, and humanitarian 
de-mining assistance.  Foreign consequence management missions involve support to 
mitigate the effects of a chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear, or high order 
explosives (CBRNE) event and to restore essential government services (JCS, 2009). 
Once it is determined by the president that a U.S. humanitarian response is 
required for a foreign disaster, the National Security Council (NSC) directs the special 
coordinator for international disaster assistance to convene an International Development 
and Humanitarian Assistance NSC Policy Coordination Committee (PCC).  The PCC 
then develops the comprehensive strategy for emergency response and the tasks for each 
key participant.  Military operations, to include FHA for FDR, are directed by the CCDR 
that is assigned to the AOR (JCS, 2009).   
The globe is divided into six geographical commands, each with a CCDR 
responsible for all aspects of its assigned missions.  These commands are U.S. Africa 
Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, 
U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command.  These commands are usually the 
first military responders in FDR operations and provide an organized response (DoD, 
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Figure 7.  Interagency Coordination Flow  
(JCS, 2009, p. II-6) 
The CCDR structures the force necessary to conduct and sustain humanitarian 
assistance operations, usually by forming a joint task force (JTF).  Advising the CCDR 
are the Department of State foreign policy advisor and USAID senior development 
officer, who provide nonmilitary insights and enhance direct communications and 
coordination with the affected embassy and country team.  The crisis action or rapid 
deployment team that each CCDR possesses is initially deployed to respond to and assess 
the situation for the commander and may recommend assistance in the form of funding, 
material, or technical assistance.  The CCDR may also organize a humanitarian assistance 
survey team (HAST) to acquire planning information by assessing the capability and 
capacity of the host nation’s government to respond to the disaster.  The HAST identifies 
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environment, and coordinates for the delivery of food and medical supplies with specific 
support arrangements (JCS, 2009).   
Additional assets and resources that the JTF may use to coordinate and facilitate 
the FDR response are civil-military operations centers, humanitarian assistance 
coordination centers, and liaison officers.  Depending on the type and severity of the 
disaster and on the restrictions emplaced by the host nation, the exact composition of 
these assets and resources will vary.  It is up to the CCDR to determine the composition 
necessary to best utilize available assets (DoD, 2011).  
3. Military Capabilities in Disaster Relief 
Organizational commands below the CCDR provide support to the JTF in 
accomplishing FDR operations.  For example, the U.S. Special Operations Command 
capabilities include the ability to establish and control the air-ground interface.  This 
command assesses and establishes landing zones, air traffic control, command and 
control communications, and coordinates the destruction of obstacles.  Military 
Information Support Operations (MISO) personnel provide the ability to communicate 
information via radio, television, leaflets, and loudspeakers to large audiences.  These 
personnel are also knowledgeable in language skills, regional orientation, and 
communications media (DoD, 2011). 
The overall logistic concept is closely integrated and mutually supports the 
operational strategy of the FHA mission.  A key element that the CCDR or JTF 
commander (JFC) considers when carrying out the planning and execution of FHA 
missions is locating logistic bases as close as possible to the relief recipients.  In major 
population centers, measures are taken to establish logistic bases that prevent moving the 
recipients from their economic and social areas.  All potential supply sources are 
considered, including the affected country’s supplies and any commercial, multinational, 
and pre-positioned supplies (JCS, 2009).  The ability of the JTF to rapidly distribute these 
supplies, especially in isolated areas, is critical to the success of disaster relief operations 
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The capabilities available to U.S. military forces to facilitate humanitarian 
operations include rapidly deployable ground transportation, aerial transport and flight 
operations, operationally flexible maritime forces, engineering abilities, full 
communications capabilities, full medical services, civil affairs support, and area security 
(DoD, 2011).  The JTF contains the units necessary to accomplish these capabilities or, 
through the CCDR, has the ability to acquire them as needed.   
The U.S. Army and Marine Corps possess ground transportation units to facilitate 
the distribution of supplies and movement of personnel.  The ground transportation 
options include medium- and heavy-lift transport trucks, material handling equipment 
such as forklifts, and the personnel to operate them.  This capability allows for the 
loading, off-loading, transfer, and distribution of supplies in a rapidly deployable manner 
(DoD, 2011). 
Aerial transportation is available through all U.S. military Services.  DoD aviation 
assets typically provide the majority of aerial support during disaster relief operations.  
From the mass cargo-carrying ability of the large transport planes to the image-producing 
abilities of unmanned aircraft, the military is able to cover the gamut of diverse and 
necessary missions in relief operations.  These include the intra-theater airlift of cargo, 
medical evacuation, aerial assessments, personnel transport, population evacuation, 
firefighting, airspace management, command and control, search and rescue, and 
personnel recovery (DoD, 2011). 
Maritime forces significantly reduce the footprint of assets ashore and minimize 
the required permissions to operate from the host nation while providing operational 
flexibility and assured access.  The forward deployed nature of the U.S. Navy’s 
amphibious ships, with their embarked expeditionary Marines, allows for an immediate 
response capability across the globe.  With its comprehensive communications 
capabilities, ground units, aviation forces, and personnel, the amphibious force is able to 
respond immediately with almost all necessary assets for FDR operations and is capable 
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The U.S. military’s engineering capabilities bring the necessary capabilities to 
restore structure to a post-disaster area.  Military personnel assess damages and needed 
repairs and assist in providing power supply and distribution, utilities repair work, water 
purification, and well drilling.  Engineering units are capable of providing facility 
construction, structural repair, camp construction, and cleanup.  They possess the 
equipment to deal with debris removal (e.g., mud, dirt, trees, and concrete), road and 
bridge construction, shelter construction, power generation, and fire suppression (DoD, 
2011). 
A key ability in FDR operations is communication.  U.S. military assets possess a 
full suite of communication capabilities.  These assets include line-of-sight, over-the-
horizon, and satellite communications systems for voice, video, and data and may be the 
only communications infrastructure.  This means that the host state and all relief 
organizations will heavily rely on military assets (DoD, 2011). 
Another key capability that U.S. forces bring to FDR operations is medical care.  
Medical care may be requested to augment or sustain the host state in order to save lives 
and minimize suffering.  The U.S. military is capable of providing emergency treatment, 
triage, surgery, pharmacy, physical therapy, dental treatment, and administrative and 
logistical services. The military can provide ground and air medical evacuation, 
veterinary services, logistics for medical supplies, and preventive medicine.  The military 
is also capable of providing patient transport and, as may be necessary in disasters, 
assistance in mass fatality management (DoD, 2011). 
The JTF possesses civil affairs units that provide personnel with culturally 
oriented and linguistic capabilities.  These personnel can provide emergency coordination 
and administration capabilities when civilian political/economic structures with the host 
state have been rendered unusable.  They have a great amount of knowledge in operations 
between civilian and military entities in permissive environments.  Their core tasks are to 
provide support to civil administration and to provide populace and resources control, 
disaster relief, and management of civil information.  Their functional specialty areas 
include rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, 
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advisors to the JFC on the impact of military activities within the civilian sector (DoD, 
2011). 
Force protection should be provided by the host state of the disaster.  In some 
cases, however, U.S. military forces may be requested to assist with security.  These 
forces may also be crucial for providing protection for the joint force and security for 
both victims and relief workers.  Specific forces are also capable of assisting in force 
protection if an environment changes from permissive to uncertain or hostile.  Military 
forces have the inherent right of self-defense and the responsibility to protect themselves 
and military assets at all times (DoD, 2011).   
Although not the primary U.S. government means of providing FHA, the foreign 
assistance that U.S. military forces are tasked to provide is designed to supplement or 
complement the efforts of the host nation’s civil authorities and agencies that have 
primary responsibility for assistance.  The U.S. military is capable of quickly reducing 
the human suffering, disease, hunger, and privation brought on from disasters.  U.S. 
forces have the unique assets for effective response and play a key role in foreign 
humanitarian crises (JCS, 2009). 
C. ADVANCEMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY IN SUPPORT OF HA/DR 
1. Disaster Classification 
To better understand the different methods of delivering HA/DR, it is important to 
understand the definition of disaster and categorize the different types of disasters so that 
implementation of relief can be at its most efficient.  Under the RSDREA (2007), a major 
disaster is any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, 
wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, 
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion. 
However, this definition is only applicable to disasters that occur in the United States 
(RSDREA, 2007). Will, Chinowsky, and Senesi (2010) defined disaster quantitatively.  
For an event to be declared a disaster, it must meet all of the following requirements: at 
least 100 human deaths, at least 100 human injuries, and at least US$1 million in 
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This definition gives rise to interesting situations of what classifies as a disaster.  
When Hurricane Katrina hit, there was substantial damage and loss of human life.  
Damages were estimated at more than US$1 million, and the situation was designated a 
disaster by the President of the United States.  However, when a plague that could equate 
to 100 human lives hits a small African village, it is not reported as a disaster. 
FEMA (1990) defines a disaster as an occurrence that has resulted in property 
damage, deaths, and/or injuries to a community. FEMA (1990) also defines it based on its 
characteristics.  Disasters can include any one event that 
 creates demands that exceed the normal capacities of any one organization 
and/or government, 
 crosses jurisdictional boundaries, 
 disables the routine equipment and facilities needed for emergency 
response, 
 compounds the difficulty of understanding “who does what” in disaster 
response due to the complexity of governments, and 
 is impacted by a lack of standardization in disaster planning and response 
and complicated coordination in a time of disaster.  
 Organizations inexperienced in disaster often respond by continuing their 
independent roles, failing to see how their function fits into the complex, 
total response effort (FEMA, 1990).  
FEMA’s definition of a disaster is more helpful for military leaders, civilian 
organizations, and logisticians because it offers a better description of a disaster, its 
implications on the surrounding populace, and the response efforts of organizations and 
agencies.  Going back to the previous example of Hurricane Katrina, hurricanes and 
weather anomalies can be tracked by meteorologists to provide advanced warning to save 
human life and mitigate damages to the surrounding area.  A plague or famine normally 
arrives with little or no warning and shows just how important operational procedures 
and logistical coordination are to providing immediate response.  Both scenarios—one 
that can be planned and one that is spontaneous—require consistent communication from 
military and civilian organizations and a logistics structure to efficiently allocate 
resources and supplies to affected areas.  
Apte (2009) offered a classification approach for disasters that represents an 
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as the time of the disaster’s onset changes (slow onset to sudden onset) and locations 
change (from localized to dispersed), the level of difficulty for disaster response 
increases.  Disasters that occur over a period of time or disasters with a slow onset 
provide time for humanitarians to plan and prepare for relief operations. However, 
disasters that strike swiftly can pose challenges for response organizations because no 
organization—military or civilian—can optimally prepare for the disaster. Strategic 
planning of assets and facility locations may help, but it is the timeliness of the response 
that matters (Apte, 2009).  
 
Figure 8.  Classification of Disasters 
(Apte, 2009) 
This model can help organizations, military Services, and logisticians with 
categorizing common disasters (dispersed, localized, slow-onset, sudden-onset) and 
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2. Technology Software Through the Years 
After each major disaster of the modern era, organizations and agencies have 
reaffirmed a critical lesson: good communication is essential to effective coordination 
(United Nations Foundation [UNF], 2011). Networks that are designed to connect 
HA/DR leaders have grown in the past, increasing the volume of data available about the 
surrounding area with few to no methods for compiling that data into useful information.  
Responders that have arrived on-scene are less than prepared to use the data given to 
effectively manage resources and supplies.  Thirty years ago, humanitarian operations 
were managed with push-to-talk radios, paper forms on clipboards, and push pins on 
paper maps. Since that time, the field has undergone a revolution (UNF, 2011). Today, 
cloud computing, text messaging, virtual telephone conferences, digital map displays, 
electronic data collectors, and sensors and super computers are making sharing and 
compiling data, processing data into accessible information, and displaying information 
on easy-to-read maps a thing of the past.  Figure 9 depicts an example of an integrated 
communication system and the importance of disaster communication media during pre- 
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Figure 9.  Example of Integrated Communications Infrastructure 
(United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific [UNESCAP], 2009) 
Natural disasters can create severe working and living conditions that 
subsequently create a unique challenge to military and civilian first-time responders.  In 
his NPS masters’ thesis, Ramsey Meyer (2011) stated that “even the systems that should 
be the most reliable are often knocked offline, such as the voice radio networks used by 
police, fire, [and] emergency medical services (EMS)” (p. 7).  Establishing 
communications, sharing information, and understanding the logistics capabilities of a 
nation post-crisis are keys to saving lives and providing relief. Many modern 
advancements in technology have been critical in saving lives, including the capability of 
WiFi clouds and satellite uplinks to share data and provide response teams with critical 
information about the area.  Also, advancements in social media (e.g., the capability to 
upload videos on YouTube, post updates on Twitter and Facebook, and take photos by 
cell phone) have helped many first-time responders to understand the environment before 
their boots ever touch the ground.  There are many lessons still to be learned about the 
response efforts after the earthquake in Haiti.  Figure 10 depicts the system enterprise 
architecture that was established during response efforts in Haiti and that helped relay 
information from responders in the field by using cell phone service and instant 
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Figure 10.  System Enterprise Architecture 
(Teasley, Covi, & Olson, 2000) 
Meyer (2011) also stated in his thesis that many successful humanitarian software 
projects exist as completely volunteer-staffed efforts, and there is no reason why software 
packages could not be supported by a group of self-organized and dedicated tech-savvy 
programmers.  With technological advancements that make media sharing easier and that 
do not always rely on hard-line connections and reliable electricity, a data-collecting 
software that could easily store information and relay it to decision-makers will help save 
lives and provide a faster recovery for the area in crisis. Meyer (2011) suggested that with 
disaster relief software in place, emergency operations center (EOC) tents could be useful 
for relaying information from the responders in the field to organizations providing the 
relief.  Figure 11 is an example of how these EOC tents would be set up (Meyer, 2011). 
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even arrive on location.  Data-sharing capabilities from social media outlets, electronic 
resource collection devices, and a nation’s own data inputs could provide military and 
civilian responders with a clear picture of the environment and provide ongoing service 
when responders enter the field.  
 
Figure 11.  Emergency Operations Center Tent 
(Meyer, 2011) 
Reliable sharing of information is necessary during the response to a disaster, but 
what is more important is ensuring that the information gets to the right decision-making 
leaders quickly in the affected AORs.  The Internet, computer software, and decision-
assisting programs have aided responders by integrating with multinational 
organizations’ data-sharing capabilities and have created a global, operational 
information hub that leaders can refer to when coordinating resources.  The U.S. Navy 
unveiled its latest web-based tool, known as the RAST, in February 2012, and this tool 
will help responders manage resources during an international disaster (Office of Naval 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
The data collection method that we used for this research topic included collecting 
literature on HA/DR relief efforts from military organizations and civilian agencies. We 
also collected data on information technology through the years and lessons learned from 
previous disaster relief efforts. These lessons learned, coupled with the advancements in 
technology, have impacted the growing need for decision-assistance tools.  Because 
COCOMs are increasingly involved in foreign disaster response, many researchers are 
striving to improve methods in logistics and the management of resources.  We used 
online databases and news archives to collect much of the findings presented in this 
research. 
The collection of data for the RAST was provided from briefs acquired from the 
COE-DMHA.  Because the RAST is a concept, the researchers could not use online 
databases and search engines.  The majority of information collected from this decision-
based tool came from our own involvement with the program, technical publications for 
the software, and the scenario that we reviewed.  We also received usage information for 
the RAST from conversations with Computer Sciences and Engineering Department 
representatives Jeremy Cohen and David Resseguie at the Oakridge National Laboratory 
in Oakridge, Tennessee.    
To better understand the framework of the RAST concept, we began the project 
with an outside-to-inside approach to collecting data and applied a cause-and-effect 
analysis.  Initially, we began by obtaining background information on the software to 
understand its interfaces with external input sensors.  By understanding how the RAST 
gets its input data, we could better understand the output information displays and 
external forces that could benefit or cause issues for the software.  We then moved on to 
categorizing the different functions and architecture of the software.  By understanding 
the software architecture, the user (and researchers) has a better understanding of where 
pertinent information is located and how to best display and funnel that information to 
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sensitivity of important information.  A user of the RAST who does not understand the 
software architecture (cause) can cause significant time delays and prevent decision-
makers from most efficiently managing resources that could cost lives (effect).  Finally, 
we ran a live PACOM-based scenario that allowed us to determine the effectiveness of 
the RAST, identify issues with the software, and recommend best solutions for managing 
these issues.  In Chapter V, we present these results and, in Chapter VI, we provide our 
recommendations for improvement of the RAST.  In Chapter VII, we provide follow-on 
research suggestions to continue with the RAST concept and its uses for HA/DR 




dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 31 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
IV. RESILIENCY ANALYSIS SUPPORT TOOL 
A. THE NEED FOR INNOVATION IN HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS 
1. Increasing Awareness of Disasters 
One of the most important aspects that the DoD needs to consider when dealing 
with disaster and humanitarian response operations is to increase situational awareness of 
disasters.  To increase situational awareness of disasters, it is important to understand the 
effects of climate change and how these climate changes increase disasters.  McGrady, 
Kingsley, and Stewart (2010) defined both the disaster response and humanitarian 
response as response operations.  Although it is hard to forecast the exact number of new 
emergencies occurring due to climate change, it is possible to predict that there is an 
increased number of rapid-onset disasters due to climate change.  In their report, 
McGrady et al. (2010) remarked that climate change increases the demand for military 
forces, changing the military requirements to assist in disaster relief efforts.  Figure 12 
depicts the relationship between climate effects and HA/DR response and how these 
changes affect U.S. policy-makers’ decisions to commit military forces.    
 
Figure 12.  Relationship Between Climate Effects and U.S. HA/DR Response 
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Climate change may alter the nature of the disaster, the type of disasters we 
respond to, the political rationale for responding, and the security context.  Changes in 
these rapid-onset disasters construct changes in response missions, and these changes in 
missions are divided into three categories: evolutionary, emergent, and revolutionary. 
 Evolutionary: missions the DoD currently performs but will do more 
often in the future. 
 Emergent: missions we currently do not perform frequently but may in 
the future due to increased intensity or risk from the disaster. 
 Revolutionary: missions that are not even possible or contemplated in a 
world without climate change, such as a response to a climate change 
cause itself. (McGrady et al., 2010) 
The common evolving missions that the military currently responds to include 
tropical cyclones, flooding, volcanoes, and earthquakes.  Any increase in the frequency or 
intensity of those events will cause the U.S. military to perform these types of missions 
more frequently.  Fire is an example of an emerging mission we currently face due to its 
potential to produce atmospheric carbon, thus changing the type of disasters that occur.  
In addition to new missions emerging, climate change may alter the priorities and 
distribution of military forces.  For example, governments may task firefighting to the 
military either because it is an emergency or because the carbon emissions may increase 
global warming.  It is important to note that increased frequency of climate effects 
increases the social and economic pressure, thus resulting in an increased need for 
military forces as part of the response (McGrady et al., 2010).  
2. DoD’s Strategy With HA/DR 
The DoD has increased its awareness of the importance of HA/DR operations 
through instructions such as DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05, which states that stability 
operations to include humanitarian assistance shall be a core U.S. military mission.  
Humanitarian assistance will not be an individual effort by any one branch or Service but 
will be an effort by all Services, departments, and agencies that fall under the DoD.  This 
instruction for providing stability operations requires that the DoD be able to provide 
capabilities and capacity to provide HA/DR operations when required.  For relief efforts 
that will be needed overseas, the DoD’s strategy for providing relief operations will 
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security forces. The DoD plans to work to establish civil security and civil control, restore 
essential services, repair and protect critical internal infrastructures, and deliver humanitarian 
assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. 
government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental 
organizations (DoD, 2009).  
DoDI 3000.05 also points out the importance of civil-military operations when 
conducting relief efforts either in the continental U.S. (CONUS) or outside the 
continental U.S. (OCONUS).  With the DoD’s strategy for operating with multiple 
agencies—civilian and military—and working with foreign governments, the capability 
to communicate and keep all players on the same page is critical.  Technology and 
communication tools will become key components for mission success while multiple 
agencies and departments are conducting HA/DR efforts.  By showing the efforts being 
provided by the responding organization and what is still needed for the country in 
distress, technology and communication tools will help ensure that resources are being 
used efficiently, timeliness of relief efforts is optimal, and synergy is built among 
responding organizations.  The RAST could be the capable and scalable HA/DR tool that 
can implement the right people in the right places, that can work to restore critical 
services (e.g., potable water, electricity, etc.), and that can help maintain civil security 
and control (DoD, 2009).   
The RAST, formerly known as the Resiliency Assessment and Coordination 
System (TRACS), accesses data from electronic sources such as the United Nations’ 
ReliefWeb and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and displays it on a 
map-based diagram showing the locations of various resources, such as food, shelter, 
sanitation, and health supplies.  The RAST is being developed through a partnership 
between the ONR and the COE-DMHA to satisfy COCOM and military component 
requirements for disaster relief.  The ultimate goal for the ONR and the COE-DMHA is 
to transition the RAST technology into large-scale use for the PACOM (ONR, 2012).  In 
the next few subsections, we discuss the RAST as it currently stands and may be utilized 
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3. Understanding the Critical Demand for the RAST 
In order to understand the function of the RAST, we first need to understand the 
demand for the RAST through the potential “customers” of the RAST.  When trying to 
define who the customers are that can benefit from this new HA/DR logistics capability, 
we define customer in two ways: the primary customer who is in charge of important 
decision-making, and the secondary customer who is in the field or is responsible for 
updating the RAST pre-crisis, during relief operations, and post-crisis.  As represented in 
Figure 13, the secondary customer would be those individuals or organizations updating 
the RAST with recent data, and the primary customer would be those individuals or 
organizations using the information generated by the RAST to determine the required 
response to the disaster and the management of those resources.  
 
Figure 13.  RAST in Relation to the Customer 
To be more exact, primary customers can be any individual or organization 
responsible for providing and coordinating response efforts and, ultimately, making 
decisions about the employment of operations.  In real world events, primary customers 
can be any military or civilian individual or organization.  In the case of the scenario to 
be covered in Chapter V, the primary customer would be the commander for PACOM 
who will be provided information gathered from data that has been input into the RAST.  
The commander of PACOM will be responsible for the overall relief efforts from the 
strategic, operational, and tactical (i.e., in the field) levels in the implementation of 
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To clearly define the secondary customers, they can be, but are not limited to 
being, a field agent, first responder, analyst for validation of data, potential user of the 
RAST, and so forth.  They are all the individuals who are responsible for the inputting of 
data, validation of data, and technical support of RAST.  In real-world events, secondary 
customers can be any military or civilian individual or organization.  In the case of the 
scenario to be covered in Chapter V, the secondary customer would be the first 
responders and field agents responsible for validating data and the accuracy of the 
previous data in the RAST to better prepare for future operations in Nepal.  
The RAST can offer its primary customers the ability to develop strategies to 
provide adequate help to the victims of disasters.  These strategies will be developed by 
having reliable real-time information that can be accessed and distributed for quick 
response.  Due to the uniqueness of disasters, specifically the Southeast Asian tsunami in 
2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, and the earthquake in 
Japan in 2012, the ability to understand the pre-crisis and real-time social, economic, and 
political infrastructures, and the availability of resources in the area, will help primary 
customers effectively employ their assets to provide relief and update the area affected as 
time progresses.   
It is essential that customers strengthen their capacity to gather, share, analyze, 
and disseminate information so that manpower and military/civilian resources are used 
efficiently.  For the secondary customers that operate in the field or the analysts updating 
the RAST when a disaster hits, this tool can serve as a communication medium prior to 
resources being deployed into the area of concern.  Because there is always a high 
likelihood that multiple nations will respond, it is imperative that a communication and 
data-sharing software such as the RAST be used because of the large number of 
responses from a diverse field of organizations (e.g., foreign and domestic militaries, 
NGOs, private companies, etc.).  Such a tool can help ensure that countries use their 
resources to their fullest and see the affected areas that need their immediate attention.   
 Having a tool such as the RAST that can be used on the strategic, operational, 
and tactical (in the field) levels during disaster responses is vital for ensuring the overall 
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efficient response has been the inability to communicate effectively, the lack of a full 
understanding of the operational environment, and the inability to provide immediate 
logistic and supply relief to the affected areas.  In the end, the time delays that occur 
because of this inefficiency can make the difference between life and death.  The RAST 
is meant to expedite decision-making by providing support. We will next discuss the 
capabilities of the RAST.  
B. CAPABILITIES OF THE RAST 
As its fundamental capability, the RAST concept is to provide first responders 
with information to begin initial planning as well as a “common operating picture,” a big-
picture view of relevant assets, for all critical players in HA/DR operations (ONR, 2012).  
The RAST is built on the premise of establishing a common understanding for the action 
and collaboration of multi-national military and civilian partnerships.  The RAST can 
provide a working architecture for management and a common understanding of the 
disaster situation and the requirements necessary to fulfill the needs of the area under 
crisis.  Figure 14 depicts an example of the RAST’s capability to collect, filter, and 
organize information so that only needed information is provided to the user and 
information overload is prevented.  Figure 15 shows the ability of the software to provide 
a common view (basic breakdown of critical needs that can be easily understood) by 
describing the response requirements of the affected area to organizations and agencies.  
Figure 16 portrays the unity of effect the RAST provides by assessing progress and 
evaluating the restoration of the interdependent systems (i.e., social elements and 
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Figure 14.  RAST Collection and Filtering of Information 
(COE-DMHA, 2011) 
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Figure 16.  RAST Assessment of Progress and Logistics Requirements 
(COE-DMHA, 2011) 
The RAST is currently in its design phase, but it will hopefully be able to fuse a 
vast amount of information (e.g., images, resource inputs, local and national media that is 
being broadcast from the crisis) and display it in various formats to provide users with a 
dashboard-like at-a-glance view of the status of numerous assets and progression of relief 
efforts.  The RAST displays the affected areas in green (good), yellow (fair), and red 
(needs help).  In the future, updates to the RAST will show what needs to be fixed—and 
in what order—to turn a red item to green.  Another tool that is planned to be added to the 
RAST is the capability to feed social media inputs into the program (e.g., Facebook, 
Twitter, etc.). This will reduce the initial footprint of first responders by allowing them to 
arrive with only the items that are actually needed for a particular event and location 
(ONR, 2012).  
Another great benefit of the RAST is that it can be updated instantaneously from 
any electronic device that offers a portal to the Internet.  This does not mean that the 
RAST will be limited in its ability to update if a region or affected area has experienced a 
loss of electricity or does not have the capability of gaining a portal to the Internet.  
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instant messaging (IM), SAT and Wi-Fi uplinks, cloud computing, and data storage can 
ensure that the RAST will always display real-time information to customers both 
operationally and administratively.  If field agents are not able to update the RAST in the 
field, redundancy in relaying time-critical information will be initiated.  Field agents will 
be able to communicate to emergency operation center tents (Meyer, 2011) via alternate 
electronic resources, and their respective agencies or military branches will be able to 
populate data and upload it to the RAST, ensuring that CCDRs will have real-time 
information in a dashboard view.  
As efforts to provide relief to the affected country are undertaken, a color-coding 
scheme based on the country’s infrastructure will be updated. This continuous flow of 
information will allow CCDRs and civilian agencies to see where they need to focus their 
efforts next to bring relief to affected areas. In Chapter V, we demonstrate how the RAST 
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V. DISCUSSION 
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RAST IN NEPAL—PRE-CRISIS 
1. Pre-Crisis View—Global View 
First and foremost, it is important to clarify that the current setup in the RAST of 
the country of Nepal is in no way reflective of the country’s current infrastructure, nor is 
it reflective of the country’s response to its own disaster relief capabilities.  This scenario 
is strictly based on hypothetical assumptions and is meant to show the capabilities of the 
RAST. Figure 17 shows the RAST initial page in Global View that responders will see 
pre-crisis. It should also be pointed out that the current name on the program is still 
reflective of its previous name, TRACS.   
 
Figure 17.  RAST Pre-Crisis 
The country’s color scheme is a critical communication tool and is indicative of 
the current economic, financial, social, and political infrastructure.  The color scheme can 
be updated by outside agencies such as the World Health Organization, Department of 
State, and even the country’s own organizations.  The RAST can be updated by Nepal 
(and outside agencies) to include categories such as Nepal’s government and economy, 
water and sanitation treatment resources, and, some day, social media outlets.  The ability 
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scheme is made available by identifying pillars of choice in the top left-hand corner of 
the RAST under Select Scoring Criteria.  In Figure 17, all pillars are being viewed 
simultaneously to show the current country’s infrastructure before a major crisis event.  If 
the country is colored dark green, then the infrastructure is working at an optimal 
capability overall.  As the colors progress from dark green to light green, from light green 
to yellow, from yellow to light red, and from light red to dark red, the infrastructure is 
becoming progressively more unstable and dependent on assistance.  Nepal is currently 
working in a slightly optimal capability.  Although the analyst has “Global View” 
selected, the analyst will then select, in the top-right corner, “Display Country Layers.”  
This function will allow the analyst to see not only the color score of Nepal but also the 
resources that are available, the locations of those resources, and the number of data sets 
that the RAST has acquired to quantify the scoring of Nepal.  Figure 18 shows the 
Display Country Layers function.  The Display Country Scores to the right of the Display 
Country Layers icon in the top-right corner toggles the color scoring of the countries in 
the RAST on and off.   
 
Figure 18.  RAST—Display Country Layers 
The RAST also offers Map, Satellite, and Terrain views to give the analyst (and 
ultimately the decision-maker) a view of the topography of the area for better 
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and Terrain views, respectively.  With these views selected, updates via satellite imagery 
can show decision-makers, such as CCDRs and civilian organizations, the potential 
obstacles of transporting supplies and resources in and out of the country that may lie in 
front of the decision-makers.  
 
Figure 19.  RAST—Satellite View 
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2. Pre-Crisis View—System View 
The RAST displays the infrastructure of Nepal in different system categories.  To 
view these pre-crisis system categories, the analyst must switch from the “Global View” 
in the top right-hand corner to the “System View.”  Once “System View” is selected, the 
analyst must select the “Systems View (Baseline)” to see the breakdown of Nepal’s 
infrastructure by Governing, Public Health, Financial, Education, Utilities, 
Business/Industry, and Environment systems.  For this scenario, we will focus on Public 
Health during a crisis.  To see the Public Health breakdown, the analyst must select 
“Public Health,” as shown in Figure 21.  
 
Figure 21.  Pre-Crisis—Nepal Public Health System 
From Figure 21, the analyst can see that the current pre-crisis Public Health 
System is already experiencing trouble in its Health Infrastructure and could use minor 
assistance in Trained Workforce and Supply Chain Management.  Now that the analyst 
can see what the current infrastructure looks like for Nepal, specifically its Public Health 
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3. Pre-Crisis View—List View  
With the Global View and System View of the RAST understood, we now move 
into the “Data Set” view to show how updates and information are fed into the RAST by 
selecting the “List View.”  After selecting “List View,” the program will display a series 
of registered data sets in descending order from the most recently added set to the oldest.  
These data sets will update the RAST with new data as it comes available and will 
populate resources and make obtainable important information that decision-makers will 
rely on heavily.  The validity of this information can also be affected by the analyst 
updating the data set.  For example, with this scenario we are looking at a pre-crisis view 
of Nepal.  We are focusing on the Public Health System of Nepal.  Once “Public Health 
System” is selected, a series of pillars are displayed that pertain to public health with 
underlying sub-pillars that decision-makers may address.  With “Public Health System” 
selected and “Potable Water” being the selected sub-pillar, the analyst can review data 
such as Percentage of population with access to potable water.  Figure 22 displays a 
snapshot of the data setup to this point.  
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The value of the percentage of population with access to potable water is 
currently set at 88%, but this value can be changed by the analyst.  If the value were to 
change because of crisis to a below optimal standard, then the overall rating and color 
scheme of the country would change from its original light green.  For example, if the 
percentage changed from 88% to 10%, the color scheme of Nepal in Global View would 
not change from its original light green color while viewing All Pillars because RAST is 
averaging all the pillars simultaneously.  However, when the analyst and the decision-
makers begin narrowing down into the details, the color scheme of Nepal will change.  
Because the “Percentage of population with access to potable water” was selected and 
changed, with the “Public Health System” pillar selected, the country of Nepal’s color 
scheme will change to a light red to show that there is a substantial issue with potable 
water being accessed by the populace.  Figure 23 depicts the results of this change on 
Nepal.  
 
Figure 23.  RAST—Potable Water Change 
Other capabilities of the RAST while in the List View are the ability to register 
new data sets that are applicable to specific pillars, add notes to the reasons why the 
analyst changed their numeric scoring of a pillar, and add already registered data sets to 
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proceed with our scenario of Nepal and the use of the RAST during the crisis with 
snapshots of relief efforts that occur.  
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF RAST IN NEPAL—POST-CRISIS 
1. Initial Scenario Constraints 
The scenario we chose to perform for this project is an outbreak of multiple 
symptoms of cholera, malaria, and dysentery in the country of Nepal.  These outbreaks 
can be fairly common when water sources have become contaminated.  Although 
earthquakes and tsunamis seemingly occur more frequently and would seem a more 
optimal choice due to the extensive historical data available, we were constrained in the 
scenarios we could run with the RAST due to its current setup because the RAST is in its 
development phase.  Once the RAST is fully operational, additional hypothetical 
scenarios can be run to better train military and civilian responders.  
2. Scenario Start 
At 0807 Zulu time (0007 PST) on March 8, 2013, an earthquake struck the city of 
Kathmandu that measured an 8.1 on the Richter scale, causing power outages in the 
country, minimum structural damage in the city limits, slight road damage, and major 
freshwater piping damage throughout the country.  Many hospitals, government offices, 
and communication facilities have switched to back-up generators for the time being.  
The government and economy appear to be in a stable state and force protection and 
security assistance are not being requested from Nepal.   
Once believing it could handle the clean-up efforts within its borders, at 1634 
Zulu time (0834 PST) on March 10, Nepal requested assistance in its recovery from the 
outside world.  Nepal has stated to the World Health Organization (WHO) that various 
cities have reported outbreaks of cholera, malaria, and dysentery post-earthquake, and 
Nepal is certain it is due to its inability to supply freshwater and provide freshwater 
services to the surrounding areas.  It is also assumed that the multiple outbreaks can be 
attributed to poor potable water treatment facilities and practices in Nepal.  Nepal is 
requesting assistance from the outside world to battle this outbreak and bring its potable 
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and is aware of the assistance Nepal is requesting. Outside NGOs, including the Red 
Cross, have also been informed and are making preparations to respond.  
a. What Should First Responders Do? 
First responders arriving to the post-earthquake scene could get an idea of 
the country’s relief efforts thus far by taking a look at the RAST in the Global View to 
see the areas that are primarily impacted by the outbreaks and what relief efforts the 
country has provided thus far.  Figure 24 shows the overall color scheme of Nepal, 
various points in the country that have been affected by the outbreaks, and relief efforts 
that are being undertaken.   
 
Figure 24.  RAST—Post-Earthquake in Global View 
One thing to note in Figure 24 is that the RAST is currently viewing All 
Pillars and is, therefore, grading all its subsequent categories simultaneously.  This is the 
reasoning for the light-green grading.    
For the first responders to see the effect of the individual pillars on the 
country, the responder would click on the pull-down menu in the top-left corner and 
select the “Scoring Criteria” and pillar that the responder is interested in.  Also, in Figure 
24 there are individual “pins” that are displayed showing areas impacted by the outbreak 
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inputs into the RAST under the List View.)  First responders can scroll over each of the 
pins and see the different outbreaks, camps that have been created for relief by the 
country, and local airports and hospitals in the areas.  
Because Nepal asked specifically for relief efforts in the areas lacking 
potable water, first responders should scroll to the Scoring Criteria and select the “Public 
Health Systems” pillar to display the sub-pillars of interest. In this case, we are interested 
in potable water.  After selecting potable water, the country’s grading scheme turns to a 
dark green.  This would seem confusing to many responders because the country is 
suffering from significant outbreaks and has no way to supply fresh water to its 
population.  The reason for this dark-green grading is because there has been no input 
into the RAST from Nepal on the country’s current potable water status.  This would 
signal to first responders that field agents and analysts are needed to visually grade the 
country’s ability to create and transport potable water.  It would also signal to responders 
that field medical teams should be ready to respond if the outbreaks worsen.   
First responders should next take a look at the RAST through the System 
View link.  Responders can now see that the hierarchy for the Public Health System, as 
displayed in Figure 25, has become more degraded than it was in Figure 18.   
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Although the Public Health System has become more degraded post-earthquake, 
first responders can get only an idea of what the current infrastructure is like.  It will take 
field agents to evaluate the situation and update the RAST to ensure its accuracy.  
Although the RAST is a useful situational awareness tool for first responders, it should be 
pointed out that sometimes the RAST may not be updated as efficiently as it should be, 
so first responders should be ready and flexible in their efforts.  From the information 
shown in Figure 25, first responders can know with certainty that post-earthquake Nepal 
has had significant outbreaks of disease and the location of these outbreaks.  They know 
the nearest medical treatment camps, hospitals and airports for medical relief, and 
logistics of supplies, and they know that the cause of the problem is due to poor potable 
water supply to the cities in Nepal.  The areas of concern for first responders are how 
extensive the damage is to the potable water pipes, and what will be needed to bring the 
country back to optimal standards.  
b. The Use of the RAST in the Field 
With the information that first responders have, they can now deploy field 
agents to Nepal to collect better information about the current potable water situation.  In 
the future, the RAST will be capable of being accessed from any portable electronic 
device (e.g., smart phones, iPads, etc.) and being updated consistently by field agents.   
For this scenario, we will assume that the RAST has this capability.  Even 
if the country’s communication towers make the Internet inaccessible, Wi-Fi hotspots and 
cloud computing make updating the RAST in the field easy.  Communications are still 
available, and communications outside of the country are still possible.  Field agents that 
are sent into Nepal will update the RAST as data become available regarding the potable 
water situation by accessing the “List View,” selecting the “Public Health System” pillar, 
and selecting the “Potable Water” sub-pillar.  Here the field agent(s) can provide updated 
information about the accessibility to potable water by the country and its infrastructure 
post-earthquake.  In the scenario, the field agents have realized that the available potable 
water percentage has changed from 88% to 10%.  After field agents have updated this 
information in the RAST, outside military and civilian response organizations can now 
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Field agents also have the capability of providing notes on the reasoning for their grading 
and significant impacts they saw in the field.  With this information, decision-makers and 
first responders can now move in and provide relief efforts.  
3. Relief Efforts and the RAST 
First responders and decision-makers now have a clearer picture of the situation in 
Nepal.  With an understanding of areas that are impacted by disease and cities that are in 
need of clean potable water and infrastructure repair of potable water systems, civilian 
and military organizations can now move in.   
As with any HA/DR relief effort, a command-and-control structure must be 
established first.  (We want to note that identification of the command-and-control 
structure is not a RAST capability, but is a recommendation we have for the RAST in its 
development.  We will treat it as an already-in-place capability for this scenario.)  Many 
of the lessons learned from previous disasters all claim that there was no clear command 
structure. In this scenario, PACOM will have overall command of and responsibility for 
the relief efforts in Nepal.  Civilian organizations will consult with their military 
counterparts before conducting relief efforts.  EOC tents will be established in the field 
that civilian organizations will have access to so they can provide relief efforts alongside 
military organizations.  This will ensure that civilian and military organizations both 
understand the efforts taking place and that resources are used efficiently.  Field agents 
will update EOC tents and the RAST as relief efforts occur, and civilian and military 
organizations will communicate with field agents to ensure the accuracy of their findings.   
Once these data are input into the RAST and deemed accurate, EOC tents will 
communicate to their respective organizations regarding the progress of the relief efforts, 
and a designated field officer/representative will brief PACOM as milestones are met.  
When all relief efforts have brought Nepal back to an optimal potable water standard and 
the infrastructure is rebuilt, field agents will update the RAST and the EOC. The EOC 
will update their organizations and the designated officer/field representative will update 
PACOM.  PACOM will give the approval for civilian and military organizations to begin 




dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 52 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
In Chapter VI, we provide recommendations for the improvement of RAST and 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE RAST 
A. IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE RAST 
The RAST is still in its development phase. However, the right design 
implementations will make it a better tool.  We offer the following recommendations for 
the continued improvement of the RAST.   
1. Social Media 
One recommendation is adding social media channels as input sources for the 
RAST.  With large-scale use of social media outlets such as YouTube, Facebook, and 
Twitter, videos and pictures that are uploaded to these social media outlets could feed 
into the RAST, giving first responders a better idea of the situation in Nepal (and any 
country post-crisis) before field agents are sent in to determine the accuracy of inputs into 
the RAST.   
2. Grading Scheme 
We also recommend a different grading scheme than the 0–100 scale used to 
determine a country’s current structure.  We feel that this scale is more difficult for field 
agents and analysts to determine what percentage best correlates to the country’s current 
status.  We feel that an alphabetized grading scheme would prove to be a better tool for 
field agents when trying to quantify their findings.  For example, if the potable water 
infrastructure was significantly degraded and deemed unacceptable, how would a field 
agent know it should be a 10% or 20% grading?  We feel that by changing the grading 
scheme to an alphabetized criterion (A–F), field agents could better quantify their 
findings and track the progress of relief efforts. For example, if the field agent arrived in 
Nepal, found the potable water infrastructure to be significantly degraded, and deemed it 
unacceptable, the infrastructure would be graded with an F.  This grading would then 
change the color scheme of the country to a dark red.  The same could be applied for the 
other color schemes and their respective colors (A=dark green, B=light green, C=yellow, 




dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó= - 54 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
3. Instant Messaging/Chat Groups 
Another recommendation we have for the RAST while it is still in the 
development phase is an IM capability.  Although talk and text forms of communication 
are available, we feel that if a field agent or a representative working in the EOC tent is 
occupied with a situation, then IM would provide a quick communication outlet that field 
agents or the EOC tent could respond to when they are free to answer.  For instance, if a 
field agent is speaking to engineers installing new piping in a potable water facility or 
training is occurring with potable water facility personnel, EOC tent representatives can 
IM the field agent what they need to communicate and the field agent can respond when 
they have time.  
We also recommend a chat board as an added feature that will allow tailoring of 
chat groups so that field analysts in a specific military or civilian organization can 
communicate to their requisite organizations without relying on voice communications.  
Having a chat feature will make relief efforts that are being led by specific group, 
military or civilian, keeping all customers in the loop.  Specific information can be made 
available in group forums, or whisper boxes can be made for more private conversations. 
4. Topography Snapshots 
We recommend that a function be added to the RAST in the Global View to show 
before-and-after snapshot imagery of the topography to give decision-makers an idea of 
how the land has changed from pre-crisis to post-crisis. Because changes in terrain can 
occur from major earthquakes and tsunamis, this would be a beneficial addition to the 
RAST.  It would also benefit first responders prior to their arrival to see what roads and 
airports are available for coordination of supplies into the affected areas.  In our scenario, 
a before-and-after snapshot of the topography would help first responders see the impact 
of earthquakes on the surrounding cities and the water treatment facilities that were 
affected.  
5. Command Hierarchy/Command-and-Control Structure 
We also recommend a screen view of the RAST that shows the current command 
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time and resource savings it provides to the overall relief effort. When civilian and/or 
military organizations respond to a crisis, they will know where to report and whom they 
should consult before engaging in relief efforts.  This will cut down on resources being 
used inefficiently and decrease the response time for providing relief to those affected, 
which will, in turn, save lives.   
In Chapter VII, we provide our conclusions and recommendations for follow-on 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
A. RAST APPLICABILITY IN THE FIELD 
Although the RAST is still in the development phase, our review shows that it has 
potential to be a valuable asset for HA/DR responders.  Its applicability as a situational 
awareness tool prior to involvement by civilian and military organizations could improve 
resource allocation coordination, which has been a hindrance in the past.  It could also 
help paint an overall picture to decision-makers so that optimal assessments can be made 
of the requirements needed to bring the country in need back to optimal standards.  The 
RAST could provide benefit by showing the country’s progression through the phases of 
relief as they occur and ensure that all players are always on the same page.  We have 
found in our scenario in Nepal that the RAST can be a beneficial tool for both primary 
and secondary customers, but there is still more work that needs to be done.  With the 
recommendations of improvement we noted in Chapter V and the follow-on research we 
present in the next section, we feel that the RAST is on its way to being a tool that can 
reduce response rates, optimize resources, and, ultimately, save lives.  
B. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
Table 5 contains a list of follow-on research items we feel would better support 
the RAST in its development.  Because we were constrained by the current setup of the 
RAST, we feel that as the RAST becomes more developed, further research can be 
conducted in these areas to better implement its uses.  We do not feel that future 
researchers should limit themselves to only these opportunities but should consider them 
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Table 4.   Follow-On Research Recommendations 
Conduct an updated scenario of the RAST in the PACOM AOR with the upcoming 
design improvements from the PACOM point of view.  
Conduct a study of the integration of the RAST with military and civilian personnel using 
role-play environments to include before training with the RAST, after training with the 
RAST, and inter-organizational responses.  
Conduct an assessment of the RAST from the point of view of the secondary customer 
and of the RAST operator before and after training.  
Conduct a study of the integration of military symbology with the RAST and determine 
its effectiveness in usability.  
Conduct an assessment of types of data that should be shared between military and 
civilian organizations in the RAST and if possible policy roadblocks could exist. 
Conduct a survey to provide suggestions on the structure of the RAST and what would 
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